1. At a Glance – Blink and You’ll Miss the Plot Twist
Websol Energy System Ltd is that stock which was once treated like a dusty solar panel kept in the godown—ignored, forgotten, occasionally mocked. Then suddenly FY25 happened and Websol went from “existential crisis” to “hold my inverter.” Revenue from operations jumped 2125% to ₹575 crore in FY25, operating margins hit ~44%, and quarterly PAT is now doing ₹60–70 crore like it’s a casual side hustle. Current market cap sits around ₹3,654 crore, CMP ~₹86, down ~29% in three months because markets love punishing stocks after good news is fully priced in.
Capacity? 1.2 GW Mono PERC solar cell and 550 MW module already running from Falta, West Bengal. Efficiency? 23%+, which is not jugaad-level stuff—this is globally respectable. Expansion plans? 5.2 GW cells and 4.55 GW modules by June 2028, backed by a ₹3,000+ crore capex plan. Promoter holding is low (27.7%) and 88% of it is pledged, which is the red flag waving like a Bollywood villain’s scarf in slow motion.
So what is Websol today? A turnaround phoenix? A policy-backed rocket? Or just another solar story that shines brightest before dusk? Let’s audit this like a suspicious CA with a stand-up mic.
2. Introduction – From Solar Zombie to Solar Stud (with Baggage)
Websol is not a new kid. Incorporated in the 1990s, it is actually one of the oldest solar PV cell manufacturers in India. When most people were still arguing whether solar was “practical,” Websol was already burning wafers in Falta SEZ.
But legacy doesn’t pay EMIs. For years, the company struggled—low utilization, weak demand, imported Chinese cells eating margins, balance sheet stress, and a stock price that behaved like a flat battery. Investors wrote it off. Analysts forgot it. Even solar bulls pretended it didn’t exist.
Then policy entered like a strict Indian parent. ALMM, BCD, PLI, DCR mandates, PM Surya Ghar, PM KUSUM—suddenly importing cheap cells wasn’t cool anymore. Domestic manufacturing became sexy again. Websol, sitting with installed infrastructure, technical know-how, and ALMM approval, found itself relevant overnight.
FY25 was the inflection. Commercialisation of new capacity flipped the P&L from survival mode to swagger mode. And FY26 Q3 numbers suggest this isn’t a one-quarter fluke. But remember—solar manufacturing is cyclical, capital-intensive, and
brutally competitive. The real test isn’t one good year. It’s whether Websol can survive the next five.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
At its core, Websol does one thing—manufactures photovoltaic crystalline solar cells and assembles them into modules. No EPC drama, no power generation headaches, no DISCOM payment trauma. Pure manufacturing.
Products:
- Mono PERC Solar Cells – High-efficiency cells used by module makers and project developers.
- Solar Modules – Used in utility-scale plants, rooftop installations, and C&I projects.
Customers:
- Utility-scale solar developers
- Rooftop & C&I installers
- Government scheme-linked projects (ALMM/DCR compliant)
Why This Matters:
India has 100+ GW module capacity, but cell capacity is far lower. This mismatch creates a structural opportunity. Modules without domestic cells are like samosas without aloo—technically possible, emotionally unacceptable (thanks to policy).
Websol is one of only eight ALMM-approved solar cell manufacturers in India. That’s not a moat, but it’s at least a fence with a guard.
So the business is simple:
Make cells → Sell to module makers & developers → Print EBITDA if utilization stays high → Pray silicon prices behave.
4. Financials Overview – Numbers That Suddenly Started Lifting Weights
Quarterly Comparison Table (₹ crore unless stated)
| Metric | Latest Qtr (Dec FY26) | YoY Qtr (Dec FY25) | Prev Qtr (Sep FY26) | YoY % | QoQ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 261 | 147 | 168 | 77% | 55% |
| EBITDA | 106 | 68 | 72 | 56% | 47% |
| PAT | 65 | 42 | 46 | 55% | 41% |
| EPS (₹) | 1.54 | 0.98 | 1.10 | 57% | 40% |
Annualised EPS (Q3 rule):
Average of Q1, Q2, Q3 EPS × 4 ≈ ₹5.0–5.2
Commentary:
Margins have compressed slightly QoQ (41% OPM vs 43–46% earlier), but this is normal during ramp-up. What matters is volume + utilization, not one-quarter margin
