1) At a Glance (The “What even is happening?” snapshot)
Gamco Ltd (BSE: 540097) is currently at ₹34.4 (as on 23 Jan, 12:04 p.m.) with a market cap of ~₹186 Cr. In the last 3 months, the stock is down ~8.95% and over 1 year it’s down ~22.3%—so yes, it has been delivering “return experiences” like a delayed train: technically moving, emotionally disappointing.
The company is a non-deposit taking NBFC doing a cocktail of equity investing + structured financing + secured lending, with side quests in real estate development and plans for Grade A warehousing (annuity dreams included). Financially, the latest quarter (Dec 2025) shows Sales of ₹86.16 Cr and PAT of -₹4.76 Cr. Operating margin is basically doing yoga into the negative: OPM -1.13% for the quarter.
Balance sheet tells you this isn’t a tiny chai-stall NBFC anymore: Debt ~₹212 Cr and Debt/Equity ~2.01, while the company also reports Current ratio ~10.9 (which is… unusual for something carrying meaningful borrowings—so you should ask, “what’s inside current assets, boss?”). Promoters hold ~70.74% (Dec 2025) with 0% pledge—good. But the company’s TTM PAT is -₹16.2 Cr, so valuation conversations start with: “First, stop bleeding. Then we talk multiples.”
So tell me—are you here for the NBFC story, or the real estate/warehouse plot twist?
2) Introduction (Setting the scene, with a torch and a calculator)
Gamco Ltd was incorporated in 1983 and describes itself as being in investments, trading of shares, and providing loans. In practice, it behaves like that one relative who says “I do business” and when you ask what business, they reply “yes”.
The stated business mix includes:
- Equity investing (including quoted securities),
- Structured financing / fixed-return portfolios / secured lending, and
- Real estate + warehouse renting with development ambitions.
That’s not automatically bad—India has plenty of holding-company-style NBFCs that do well. But it does mean your analysis cannot be lazy. You don’t evaluate this like a clean retail lender. You evaluate it like a capital allocator with balance sheet leverage, operating cost structure, and “other income” behaviours.
Now look at the quarterly numbers: the company swung from strong quarters (Jun 2024, Sep 2024) to a brutal Mar 2025, then recovered in Jun 2025, and then slipped again in Sep/Dec 2025. If Gamco’s P&L was a Bollywood script, the interval would have a warning: “Emotional volatility. Viewer discretion advised.”
Before we go further—do you prefer businesses that are predictable, or businesses that keep you “engaged” like a daily soap?
3) Business Model — WTF Do They Even Do?
A) Equity Investing (The “market mein lagaya hai” department)
Gamco provides equity market investments and claims a preference for companies with low debt and free cash flows, with an intent around debt repayment visibility. As of 31 March 2024, it had quoted securities investments of ₹10,225.29 Lakhs (i.e., ₹102.25 Cr).
Equity investing as a business model is simple:
- When markets are friendly, you look like Warren Buffett.
- When markets aren’t, you look like a WhatsApp tipster with a spreadsheet.
The key is risk control and funding stability—because investing with borrowed money is like playing poker with your landlord’s rent.
B) Real Estate (The “property bhi hai” angle)
The company has exposure to residential and commercial realty development, including:
- A 12% stake in a large township project in Lucknow, and
- Through wholly owned subsidiaries, 22 acres in Kolkata.
Real estate can be a wealth creator, but it can also be a cash-flow black hole wearing a suit. Without project-level disclosure in this dump, we stick to what’s stated: it exists, and it’s meaningful enough to be highlighted.
C) Warehousing (The “annuities incoming” dream)
Gamco plans Grade A warehousing aimed at MNC clients to build annuity income. This is the classic Indian corporate arc:
“Trading/Investing → Real estate → Warehousing → Stable annuity → Investor re-rating.”
Sometimes it works. Sometimes it becomes PowerPoint warehousing.
Question for you: if a company does equity investing + real estate + warehousing + lending… are you getting diversification, or distraction?
4) Financials Overview (Locked Result Type: QUARTERLY RESULTS)
Key quarterly comparison table (All figures ₹ Cr, EPS in ₹)
| Metric | Latest Quarter (Dec 2025) | Same Qtr Last Year (Dec 2024) | Previous Quarter (Sep 2025) | YoY % | QoQ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (Sales) | 86.16 | 5.43 | 86.94 | +1486.7% | -0.9% |
| EBITDA (Operating Profit) | -0.97 | -4.29 | -7.02 | +77.4% | +86.2% |
| PAT (Net Profit) | -4.76 | -4.93 | -8.30 | +3.4% | +42.7% |
| EPS (₹) | -0.88 | -0.91 | -1.54 | +3.3% | +42.9% |
Notes on % calculation: When bases are negative, percentages can mislead; here YoY/QoQ is shown using change relative to absolute base to avoid “profit improved -5000%” type nonsense.
Witty audit note: Revenue jumped massively YoY because Dec 2024 sales were tiny (₹5.43 Cr) and Dec 2025 is back at scale (₹86.16 Cr). That’s not “growth”; that’s coming back to normal after a weird low base. The more important question is: can they make money at this scale? Because Dec 2025 still produced negative operating profit and negative PAT.
EPS annualisation (Quarterly rule — Q3)
Latest quarter is Dec 2025 (Q3).
Rule: Annualised EPS = Average of Q1, Q2, Q3 EPS × 4
- Q1 (Jun 2025) EPS: 2.73
- Q2 (Sep 2025) EPS: -1.54
- Q3 (Dec 2025) EPS: -0.88
Average EPS = (2.73 + (-1.54) + (-0.88)) / 3
= (0.31) / 3
= ~0.1033
Annualised EPS = 0.1033 × 4 = ~₹0.41
So yes, we annualised into a small positive number, even though the latest quarter EPS is negative—because Q1 was strong enough to pull the average barely above water. It’s like scoring “pass” because one subject carried the whole semester.
Now tell me—do you trust a company where one quarter plays hero and the next two play villains?
5) Valuation Discussion — Fair Value Range Only (Educational, not advice)
Current price (CMP): ₹34.4
Market cap: ~₹186 Cr
Book value: ₹19.5 → P/B ~1.77
Enterprise Value (EV): ₹396 Cr
Method 1: P/E based (using annualised EPS from locked quarterly method)
Annualised EPS (Q3 method) = ~₹0.41
Implied P/E at CMP = 34.4 / 0.41 = ~84x
Now compare with available reference points in the dump:
- Industry P/E: 26.3
- Peer median P/E: 27.92
If Gamco were valued at 26x–28x on annualised EPS:
- Fair value range = EPS × Multiple
= 0.41 × (26 to 28)
= ₹10.7 to ₹11.5 (rounded)
Interpretation: At face value, CMP looks far above what a plain industry multiple would justify on this EPS base. But that assumes EPS is sustainable. Here EPS is unstable, so P/E can be a comedy show.
Method 2: EV/EBITDA based (using latest available full-year operating profit)
TTM EBITDA in the dump is negative (TTM operating profit -₹8 Cr), making EV/EBITDA messy. So we use the latest clean annual data point shown:
From Profit & Loss:
- Mar 2024 Operating Profit (EBITDA proxy): ₹46 Cr
EV = ₹396 Cr
So EV/EBITDA (Mar 2024 EBITDA proxy) = 396 / 46 = ~8.6x
A purely mechanical sensitivity band around this (educational, not “market multiple”):
- 7x to 10x on ₹46 Cr EBITDA
→ EV range: ₹322 Cr to ₹460 Cr
To translate EV to equity value, you’d typically adjust for net debt. This dump provides Debt ~₹212 Cr, but does not provide a matching cash figure in the snapshot section (cash is not explicitly stated there), so we do not compute an equity fair value number from EV to avoid inventing missing inputs.
Interpretation: On FY24 EBITDA, the EV multiple doesn’t look insane. The issue is: FY24 profitability isn’t repeating consistently.
Method 3: DCF (Only what can be done with given data — reality check)
Cash flows (₹ Cr):
- Mar 2023 CFO: -6
- Mar 2024 CFO: 41
- Mar 2025 CFO: -38
That’s not a stable cash machine; it’s a cash roller coaster. A DCF needs some reasonable cash flow baseline and forward visibility. With this volatility, any DCF would become assumption soup, which we avoid.
So the DCF conclusion, based strictly on available cash-flow history:
- Cash flow visibility is too unstable to assign a reliable DCF-based fair value range without heavy assumptions.
✅ Fair value range summary (educational only):
- P/E method (industry/peer multiples on annualised EPS): ~₹10.7–₹11.5
- EV/EBITDA: meaningful only if FY24 profitability is repeatable; equity conversion not computed due to missing cash/net debt clarity in the dump.
- DCF: not reliable due to volatile/negative operating cash flows.
Disclaimer (must-read): This fair value range is for educational purposes only and is not investment advice.
Now comment like a normal human: should we value Gamco like an NBFC… or like a holding company with real estate/warehouse optionality?
6) What’s Cooking — News, Triggers, Drama
Gamco’s announcements are busy
