Finkurve Financial Services Ltd Q2 FY26 – The Gold Loan Juggler Balancing Borrowings, Co-lending, and Comedy in the NBFC Circus
1. At a Glance
Finkurve Financial Services Ltd (FFSL) – a name that sounds like a fintech startup but operates like an NBFC veteran from 1984 – just dropped its Q2 FY26 results, and boy, it’s shiny like the gold it lends against. The company reported a PAT of ₹5.92 crore, up 70.6% YoY, and a Sales of ₹48.05 crore, up 50.6% YoY. That’s not “soft recovery”; that’s “sprint in gold chappals” level performance.
At a current price of ₹100, FFSL commands a market cap of ₹1,405 crore and flaunts a P/E ratio of 68.4x – because apparently, investors believe comedy and compounding deserve the same valuation. Despite the glamour, promoter holding slipped by 5.82%, and 19% shares are pledged – reminding us that behind every shiny NBFC lies some old-fashioned leverage.
Their AUM surged to ₹671.35 crore, nearly doubling YoY, while their ROE stands at 8.81% and ROCE at 11.2% – not flashy, but steady enough to survive RBI’s caffeine-induced circulars. Debt? ₹382 crore. Dividend? Non-existent. But who needs dividends when you have 70% secured loans, fintech friends, and a co-lending tie-up with RBL Bank that screams, “Let’s borrow cheap, lend smart, and pray the algorithm behaves!”
The cherry on the balance sheet cake: authorized capital up to ₹14 crore, borrowing limit lifted to ₹600 crore, and plans to issue NCDs worth ₹200 crore. Clearly, Finkurve is gearing up for its next act – the “Leverage for Growth” show.
2. Introduction
Let’s start with some context. Finkurve isn’t your regular NBFC lost in the pile of balance sheets. It’s the lovechild of traditional lending and digital fintech enthusiasm. Founded in 1984 as Sanjay Leasing, it now calls itself a base-layer NBFC that specializes in gold loans, payday loans, and co-lending. That’s like being a banker, a pawnbroker, and a fintech app – all at once.
Its recent transformation is powered by partnerships. The most notable is with RBL Bank and Augmont Goldtech. Picture this: gold lending meets digital platforms meets bank-grade liquidity – a “co-lending ménage à trois” that aims to scale retail reach without burning cash.
But it’s not just gold that glitters here. The company’s retail loan portfolio now forms 53% of total AUM, while corporate exposure shrunk to around 30%. Clearly, Finkurve read the RBI manual titled “Too Much Corporate Exposure Can Kill You” and decided to diversify.
And yet, for all its new-age talk, the company behaves like an old uncle at a fintech party – cautious, conservative, but surprisingly good at numbers. Over the last five years, sales have grown at a CAGR of 54%, and profits at 34%. Not bad for a lender that still files paperwork faster than most startups onboard users.
What’s the secret sauce? Maybe it’s gold. Maybe it’s fintech. Or maybe it’s the fact that Finkurve figured out how to make 11% coupon NCDs sound sexy.
3. Business Model – WTF Do They Even Do?
Alright, let’s decode this circus. Finkurve Financial Services Ltd is an NBFC that lends money in every format except emotional support. It’s into gold loans, educational loans, payday loans, and other consumer loans through digital platforms. Basically, if it’s shiny, short-term, or slightly risky, they’ll fund it.
Their gold loan business operates under a co-lending partnership with RBL Bank via Augmont Goldtech’s digital platform. This means RBL brings cheap funds, Finkurve brings loan processing and collections, and Augmont brings the tech bling. It’s the financial version of “three idiots” but with RBI supervision.
Their loan book reached ₹249.62 crore in 9M FY24, with 70% secured loans – a crucial detail that means less sleepless nights for auditors. They’ve consciously moved away from large corporate exposures (still ~30%) to focus on retail lending – aka “lend to more people, lose less per person.”
Their revenue model is delightfully simple:
75% of revenue comes from interest income
25% comes from fees and commissions (because every loan deserves some paperwork profit)
They even approved issuing NCDs worth ₹200 crore – because why borrow at 12% when you can call it “financial engineering”?
In short, Finkurve’s business is like a South Indian thali – lots of small items (retail, gold, digital), a few heavy curries (corporate loans), and a spicy aftertaste (NCD leverage).
4. Financials Overview
Let’s dive into the data for Q2 FY26 (September 2025) — officially labeled “Quarterly Results”. Therefore, EPS will be annualized ×4.
Source table
Metric
Latest Qtr (Sep’25)
YoY Qtr (Sep’24)
Prev Qtr (Jun’25)
YoY %
QoQ %
Revenue (₹ Cr)
48.05
31.90
39.88
50.6%
20.5%
EBITDA (₹ Cr)
16.41
8.49
14.50
93.3%
13.2%
PAT (₹ Cr)
5.92
3.47
5.09
70.6%
16.3%
EPS (₹)
0.42
0.27
0.36
55.6%
16.7%
Annualised EPS = 0.42 × 4 = ₹1.68
Commentary: The numbers look juicier than an IPL auction bid. Revenue up by 50%, PAT up 70%, margins back above 30%. The only thing not rising is the dividend.
5. Valuation Discussion – Fair Value Range Only
Let’s perform some honest math.
a. P/E Method Current Price = ₹100 Annualised EPS = ₹1.68 → Current P/E = 100 / 1.68 = 59.5x (versus industry average of 21.1x) If valued at industry average → 1.68 × 21.1 = ₹35.5 If given fintech premium (35x) → ₹58.8 👉 Fair Value Range: ₹35 – ₹59
b. EV/EBITDA Method EV = ₹1,748 crore EBITDA (FY25) = ₹54 crore → EV/EBITDA = 32.4x Peer average (Bajaj, Shriram, Muthoot) ~ 18x → Fair Value Range = ₹970 – ₹1,200 crore EV
