Teerth Gopicon Ltd (TGL) is that kid in class who suddenly topped one year and is now struggling to maintain consistency. Incorporated in 2019, it went from digging drains in Madhya Pradesh to bagging ₹454 Cr Indore Smart City land development and even rooftop solar projects. On paper, it’s a construction + EPC + wannabe real estate + renewable energy play. In reality? The stock crashed -79% in one year, management keeps swapping auditors faster than actors in an Ekta Kapoor serial, and a ₹184 Cr bank guarantee is stuck in CBI investigation.
2. Introduction
Imagine a civil contractor who thought “why only roads and sewerage, let’s also build high-rises, solar parks, and maybe a lake or two.” That’s TGL’s vibe.
They started with Madhya Pradesh municipalities—laying pipes in Indore, fixing sewers in Jabalpur, rejuvenating lakes in Ujjain—basically India’s version of being a plumber, mason, and civil engineer rolled into one. Then came the real estate twist: Indore Smart City handed them a land tender worth ₹454 Cr with a revenue potential of ~₹1,875 Cr. That’s like a small-town contractor suddenly being handed DLF’s blueprint.
But like every Bollywood script, there’s a twist:
Bank guarantee issues → contracts terminated.
Auditors resigning → one after the other.
Shareholders → staring at a stock that went from ₹774 to ₹106 faster than Paytm’s fall from grace.
Question for you: Is TGL the next “dark horse infra + renewable story” or just another “SME bubble stock” waiting for SEBI’s magnifying glass?
3. Business Model (WTF Do They Even Do?)
Let’s break it down:
Civil Works: Roads, sewerage, overhead tanks, water supply pipelines. Think municipal-level work where payments come late but the contracts look juicy.
Real Estate: Recent land parcel in Indore for a mixed-use tower. TGL wants to be a mini-DLF in Madhya Pradesh.
Renewables: Rooftop solar projects in Rajasthan and UP.
Equipment Strategy: From hiring JCBs to owning cranes—because depending on rental vendors is like depending on relatives for shaadi loans, risky and unreliable.
So yes, TGL wants to be “infra + real estate + renewables.” The question is—can a 2019-incorporated SME handle that buffet?
4. Financials Overview
Quarterly Snapshot (₹ Cr)
Source table
Metric
Latest Qtr (Mar’25)
YoY Qtr (Mar’24)
Prev Qtr (Sep’24)
YoY %
QoQ %
Revenue
50.3
68.0
68.0
-26.0%
-26.0%
EBITDA
9.0
16.0
16.0
-43.8%
-43.8%
PAT
3.32
10.0
10.0
-66.8%
-66.8%
EPS (₹)
2.77
7.93
7.93
-65.0%
-65.0%
Annualised EPS = ₹2.77 × 4 = ₹11.1 CMP = ₹106 → P/E ≈ 9.5 (reasonable vs industry avg ~22, but market clearly doesn’t trust them).
Commentary: Revenue crashed, profit nosedived, and EPS went on a diet. This is not “cyclical slowdown”; this is “order execution + BG legal mess” combined.
5. Valuation (Fair Value RANGE only)
P/E Method: EPS ₹11.1 × Industry PE 15–20 → FV range ₹167–222.
EV/EBITDA: EV ₹158 Cr / EBITDA (₹25 Cr TTM) = 6.3. Peer avg ~10–12. Fair EV = ₹250–300 Cr → FV range ₹165–200/share.
DCF (rough): Assume ₹200 Cr order book executed over 3 yrs with 10% margins, 12% discount → FV ~₹150–180.
👉 Final FV Range: ₹150–210 (for educational purposes only, not advice).
6. What’s Cooking – News, Triggers, Drama
Indore Smart City Land Tender: ₹454 Cr → ₹1,875 Cr potential. If executed, TGL transforms from a roadside contractor to a mini-realtor.
